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RESTITUTION To ViCTimS OF CRIME. By Stephen
Schafer. London: Stevens & Sons, Ltd.; Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, Inc., 1960. Pp. vii, 130.
$4.75.
The topic of this book has been for a long time
in the limelight of criminal law interest in civil
law countries and has recently become the subject
of lively discussion in the area of common law
tradition.'
The body of the volume, entitled "Survey of
Foreign Legislation," consists of reports of the
victim compensation provisions of thirty coun-
tries, a separate chapter being devoted to the law
of each country.2 This method of presentation
would have been proper if the purpose of the
volume were to convey understanding of the legal
culture of each of the thirty countries or to serve as
a reference book for lawyers and claimants. But
since the purpose of the book is rather to present
various solutions of problems facing the law re-
former,3 it would have been preferable to focus
attention on problems rather than on description
of national systems. A problem orientation would
also have helped in avoiding the impression of
repetitiousness.
The issues to be resolved under the heading
"Compensation for victims of crime" may be
grouped into several categories: (1) the scope of
the compensation claims; the assets -against which
such claims may be asserted; the claim holders
and adversaries; (2) the private or public nature of
compensation claims and the manner of their
* Assistant Professor of Sociology, Department of
Sociology and Social Institutions, 206 South Hall,
University of California, Berkeley 4, California.
I For a recent discussion of the subject, see Sympo-
sium, Compensation For Victims Of Criminal Violence;
A Round Table, 8 J. PUB. L. 191-253 (1959).
2 The sources of these reports are mainly answers
to a questionnaire (see Appendix to the book being
reviewed, hereinafter cited as SCHAFER, at p. 130),
which answers were supplied by legal authorities of
the respective foreign countries. Compare SCHAFER,
p. 16.
2 That this is the purpose of the book may be in-
ferred from the fact that it winds up with a reform pro-
posal. SCHAFER, pp. 128-29.
assertion; (3) issues raised by modern attempts at
integrating compensation into the penal system;
(4) methods of relief for the victim (Sorge flir den
Verletzten) .4 All these issues and particularly
those of the second and third group raise signifi-
cant problems of the political and social philosophy
of criminal justice, to be resolved after careful
scientific, i.e., psychological and sociologic, eval-
uation of the impact of potential solutions.
Should the victim's damage be determined by
the criminal court ex officio? Ought a private
claimant be permitted to enter criminal proceed-
ings at all? If so, to what extent should he be
allowed to intervene in the course of such pro-
ceedings? 5 Indeed, should he have the power of
originating them, whether in his capacity as a
private claimant, as is the case in France, 6 or
because any citizen possesses the capacity of
initiating criminal proceedings, as is the case in
4 For a fairly comprehensive comparative law report
on problems of victim indemnification see Gloss,
Die Schadloshaltung des Verletzten, in 2 MATERIALIEN
ZUR - STRAFRECHTSREORM, RECHTSVERGLEICHENDE
ARBEITEN, I ALLGEMEINER TEIL 277-307 (Bonn,
1954).
It may be mentioned that the term "restitution"
used by Schafer to designate a comprehensive in-
demnification is particularly ill-chosen, since in many
laws-e.g., Spanish law and Latin American laws-"resithcin" denotes return of a "thing" taken from
the victim, as distinguished from payment of damages,
that are designated, e.g., in the Spanish Penal Code
of 1944, arts. 101-104, as "reparation of the damage
caused" (dafio) and "indemnification for the moral
damage (perjuicios)."
IThis questions complex comprises the following:
Should the claimant have a right to be notified of
pending proceedings and perhaps also instructed as to
his right to join them? Should he have a right to make
motions and objections as regards the evidence or inci-
dental or final case disposition, to put questions to
witnesses, and if so, only as to the indemnification as-
pect or as to the punitive aspect as well? Should the
procedure of claim determination before a criminal
court be governed by rules of criminal law or by those
of civil law? What appellate remedies should be avail-
able to the private claimant? Should the court have the
power to relegate the damage claim to a civil court, if
disposition of that claim unduly burdens the criminal
case?
6French CODE DE PROCtDURE P]9NALE, art. 1,




Spain?7 Should the compensation claim play a
role in the authorized disposition of the offender?
Should it be deemed an incidental or, indeed, the
principal criminal sanction? All of these questions
must be resolved on the basis of fundamental
ideologies of justice, in the light of scientific
findings. The author's method of presentation is
not apt to elucidate the profound import of each
of these questions.'
In the latter part of the book the author offers
reform suggestions. Prominent among these is
the idea that restitution be turned into a punitive
concept; that it be awarded as part of the criminal
judgment, along with punishment, and that it be
deemed a penalty. The rationale of this suggestion
begins with the much exploited proposition that
retribution is vengeance and that the aim of
criminal law should be instead to reform the
offender and to indemnify the victim. The author
believes that the difference between civil and
criminal law has been grossly exaggerated and
that the once exclusive legal reaction to crime,
"restitution," later transformed into a civil
remedy,9 may be fruitfully utilized as a penal
sanction. Such sanction, in the author's view, would
fulfill the dual function of a reformative device
and of a means of satisfying the victim's interests
realistically rather than by responding, as does
conventional punishment, to his vindictive urges.
The reformative potential of restitution lies, ac-
cording to the author, in two of its features: (1)
restitution brings home to the offender the realiza-
tion that he injured not solely an abstract "com-
munity" or "State" but also, and indeed pri-
marily, a concrete individual; (2) it "may redirect
in a constructive way those same conscious or
unconscious thoughts, emotions or conflicts, which
motivated the offence."'1 The author submits
that punitive restitution be made payable also
from the offender's earnings and that the amount
should be adapted to the offender's "social posi-
7 Spanish LEY DE ENJuicAMENTO cRImNAL, art.
101, para. 2 in 1 MAJADA, MANUAL DE FORMULARIOS PE-
NALE 132 (2d ed. 1956).
8 Of course, categories (1) and (4) also raise signifi-
cant problems of political philosophy. Notice, e.g.,
the recent expansion of the notion of "moral damage"
caused by the growing scope of the concepts of "per-
sonality rights" and "privacy interests," at times in-
ferred from constitutional provisions on "man's dig-
nity." On this see HUBuANN, DAS PERS6NLICHKEITS-
RECHr (1953).
9For a historical survey, see Part I of SCHAFER,
pp. 3-12.
10 SCHAFER, pp. 124-25.
tion, personal circumstances, and reasonable but
minimum standard of living.""
There is no clear indication of the extent to
which, in the author's view, confusion of criminal
and civil law and procedure may be admitted.
Conceding that the distinction between these
two types of law is relative, I should like to warn
against inferring from such relativity that the
distinction is not important. A caveat is necessary.
Progress in law administration was marked by
increasing emancipation of criminal law from
"compensatory" law and by replacement of in-
terpersonal execution by an impersonal meting
out of "justice." In the course of that progress,
blood "redemption" executed by the victim's
kin yielded to impartial punishment, wielded by
an abstractly conceived State as the instrument
of justice. Thus "justice" was objectivized. In
fact, the very idea of "justice," as an abstract
general ethical concept rather than as a ritualistic
formulary for "redemption of blood," i.e., neu-
tralizing magic by countermagic or "undoing"
whathas been "done," is the product of such
objectivization.1 Transfer of "punitive power"
to the State marks the beginning of refinement of
legal ethics, pointing man's attention to aspects
of his conduct that lie beyond the immediate
situation. Such transfer, at the same time, made
possible development of a distinctive notion of
protection afforded the accused in criminal pro-
ceedings, not available to the defendant in civil
proceedings. Only as against the State can the
accused preserve his status of privilege, his civil
rights of reliance on a penal code as his Magna
Charla, of a far-reaching presumption of innocence
and of requirement of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 3 An autonomous concept of criminal law
and procedure is thus an imperative imposed by
the idea of a "free society." Any intervention of
the private claimant in criminal proceedings is
11 SCHAFER, p. 129. Since the author-it is believed,
correctly-objects to conversion of the punishment of
"restitution" into any other kind of penalty, the prob-
lem is how an offender, left with only a "minimum
standard of living," can be prevented from refusing
to work.
1 The "redeemer of blood," executing the penalty
provided for by general legislation and determined by a
court, is a Biblical remnant of the idea of justice in
terms of an immediate interpersonal relationship.
13 These privileges are limitations on the "ins pu-
niendL" In dvil cases, where "punishment" is not in
issue, the interests of the tort-feasor and the victim
are entitled to equal protection.
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incompatible with such concept.j 4 His role in such
proceedings even in the capacity of a witness must
be viewed with suspicion. Our law should guard
itself against intrusion of the civil law ideas of
private intervention in criminal proceedings.
Criminal and civil cases must be kept distinct and
separate. Criminal law must remain a domain in
which concern with, and protection of, the accused
are paramount to all other considerations.
The stated rationale of the separation of criminal
and civil law also implies that within the former
law the goals of justice focussed on the offender
must be deemed superior to the State goal of care
for the victim. This means that there must be no
compromise, and thus no complete integration,
of the two types of goals within the penal system.
Such integration is inadmissible except within a
positivist criminal law philosophy of the type
advocated by Ferri and Garfola (but not by Dorado
Montero)-a philosophy ultimately concerned
with neither the offender nor the victim but with
the so-called "community."
It follows that criminal law is not the proper
discipline for "care for the victim." Thus, in-
stitution and regulation of a State Compensation
Fund for Crime Victims, similarly as regulation of
civil liability arising from crime commission, have
no place in a penal code.15 Such fund may and
should be established by special law or as part of
the provisions of a civil code.16
However, separation of criminal and civil law
does not imply disregard in the former of the
damage caused to the victim or of the victim's
role in crime causation; nor should compensation
of such damage be a limine discarded as potential
criminal sanction adapted to the specific ends of
criminal law. For there is a great deal of realism
in Jos6 Agustin Martinez's description of the
crime, the offender and the victim as "the penal
14 However one might try to keep separate the civil
and the criminal aspect of a single proceeding, it is
hardly possible to neutralize the effect of civil inter-
vention in the criminal case.
I5 Regulation of civil liability in criminal codes is
not of positivist origin, but has been promoted by the
positivist movement. For examples of such provisions
see ITALIAN PENAL CODE, arts. 185-198; SPANISH
PENAL CODE, arts. 19-22, 101-111; BOLIVIAN PENAL
CODE, arts. 18-25; CUBAN CODE OF SOCIAL DEFENSE,
arts. 110-127. For penal code provisions establishing a
State Compensation Fund see, e.g., PENAL CODE OF
PARAGUAY, art. 108; PENAL CODE OF PERU, arts. 77,
403-404; as regards Cuba, see SCHAFER, pp. 69-72.
11 When such fund has paid the victim and succeeds
to the latter's claim by subrogation, that claim ought
not to be transformed into a public claim that might
be executed against the body of the offender.
.triangle."' "7 It is rarely a mere coincidence that a
given offender commits a given crime in a given
manner against a given victim, causing him a
given damage. Psychoanalytic insight throws an
interesting light on the phenomena of unconscious
interaction between the victim and the offender
and of the victim's "unintentional complicity" in
crime, as well as on the share of the unconscious
of the offender, of the victim or of both in causa-
tion of the "consequences" of criminal conduct-
the damage "caused" by crime. 8 The victim's
damage is part of the social harm produced by
crime and thus a significant element of the com-
prehensive concept of "responsibility." In as-
sessing the damage "caused by the offender" due
consideration should be given to the victim's
conscious and/or unconscious contribution to
the total damage suffered by him.1 9 But in order
to determine from the standpoint of criminal law
goals whether indemnification of the victim should
be also incorporated into criminal law as a form
of punishment, the advantages of such policy
must be weighed against its disadvantages.
Undoubtedly, indemnification of the victim
affords a realistic rehabilitative device in an ob-
jective sense. Society attributes a great deal of
significance to "repayment" of the damage done;
it views it as an atonement and as a sign of re-
pentance. In this sense, "repayment" may facili-
tate the offender's finding his way back to society.
However, as regards subjective "rehabilitation"
by compensation, the problem is much more
complex than Dr. Schafer seems to realize. He
cites Aichhorn as authority for the proposition
that compensation of the damage caused to the
victim may be a reformative device.2 0 But no
one more than Aichhorn has stressed the need for
17 MARTINEZ, CODIGO DE DEFENSA SOCIAL 21 (new
rev. ed., 1939), letter of transmittal accompanying the
draft of Book I of the Cuban Code.
18 See Weihofen, in Symposium, Compensation For
Victins Of Criminal Violence, op. cit. supra note 1, at
209-18.
19 The most important argument against admission
of considerations based on unconscious factors is that
they cannot be proven, since they are unknown even
to the subject himself. However, there are certain ex-
ternal indicia of unconscious motivations (e.g., failure
to take precautions against crime, behavior inviting
crime, prior relationship to the victim, being a re-
peated crime victim) that could be certainly relied on
in limiting penal responsibility.
20 AICHHORN, WAYWARD YOUTH (revised and adapted
from the second German edition of VERWAHRLOSTE
JUGEND, 1935). I have found no support for the propo-
sition in the text in the chapter of Aichhorn's book
(chapter 10) cited by SCHAFER, note 13 at 125.
[Vol. 52
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differential treatment of diverse cases. Where, as
so often happens, the subject is "in open conflict
with society," Aichhorn's views can hardly be
invoked in support of a recommendation that such
subject be compelled to "repay" the victim of
his aggression for the "wrong" that he had done
to that victim 2' Certainly, compelling the offender
against his will to relive each payday the crime
experience-as suggested by Dr. Schafer's recom-
mendation that the "restitution" sentence be
enforceable against earnings-may well, unless
perhaps preceded by appropriate successful treat-
ment, increase rather than diminish the offender's
aggressiveness. The resentment thus evoked may
promote rather than prevent crime repetition~n
A most important argument against introduction
into the penal system of "punitive compensation"
is that there is implied in such compensation, as
in all forms of monetary sanction, an element of




Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
DELINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY: A THEORY OF
DELINQUENT GANGS. By Richard A. Cloward
and Lloyd E. Olin. Glencoe, Ill.: The Free
Press, 1960. Pp. xi, 220. $4.00.
This book, by two sociologists at the New York
School of Social Work of Columbia University,
accounts for the emergence, differentiation, and
persistence of delinquent subcultures among lower-
class adolescent males in urban areas by applica-
tion of a "theory of differential opportunity
structures." The delinquent norms are the "most
crucial elements" of the subcultures, for they
constitute the basis of differentiation by "principal -
orientation" between the three main forms: the
criminal, the conflict, and the retreatist (drug-
consuming) subcultures.
In too brief form, the account is as follows:
21 See particularly AicHHoRN, op. cit. supra note
20, at 120-123, 167-185, 200-210.
2 Studies in "victimology" show that an accused's
special resentment against a sentence imposing upon
him a penalty of indemnifying the victim may not be
unjustified.
2 Even the system of computing fines in terms of
daily income units works relative injustice, since it
reduces the poor man's standard of living whereas it
may not affect a wealthy man's manner of life at all.
* The views expressed in this book review are solely
those of the reviewer. They do not reflect the opinions
of the Penal Reform Commission of the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico.
The keys to the emergence of a delinquent sub-
culture are the presence among these youths of a
shared problem of adjustment with blocked legitimate
solutions, which tends to produce collective deviant
solutions, and the process of alienation, that is,
the-withdrawal of legitimacy, as distinguished from
"moral validity," from conventional social norms,
which permits the adoption of delinquent adapta-
tions. This alienation is produced by a predisposi-
tion to blame one's failure on "unjust social
arrangements," a response itself facilitated by ob-
jective discriminations against oneself. The shared
problem of these youths is "the disparity between
what lower-class youths are led to want and what
is actually available to them." (p. 86) Given this
"limited access to success goals by legitimate
means, the nature of the delinquent response that
may result will vary according to the availability
of various illegitimate means." (p. 152) The crimi-
nal subculture emerges in the "integrated slum," as
described b3y Kobrin, and the conflict subculture
in the "unintegrated slum." (pp. 171-77) The
retreatist subculture emerges because some of
these youths are "double failures," having failed
to "find a place" in either of the other subcultures
(p. 183), and because drugs are available. (p. 152)
The persistence of a subculture is determined by
the ability to recruit new members, the integra-
tion of age-groups, and the integration of sub-
cultures. (p. 188)
Their presentation is sufficiently persuasive to
give considerable weight to the authors' prediction
that "delinquency will become increasingly ag-
gressive and violent in the future" (p. 203), and
their conclusion that, because delinquency is not
"a property of individuals or even of subcultures"
but of "the social system in which people are
emeshed," the "major effort of those who wish
to eliminate delinquency should be directed to the
reorganization of the slum." (p. 211)
This book is important not only for its sub-
stance, but also for its form. It seeks to account
systematically for a specified phenomenon, "de-
linquent subcultures," with a special application
("a theory of delinquent gangs") of a more general
theory ("a theory of differential opportunity
systems"). Every such effort is a substantial
contribution to the social sciences.
Because of this, it is unfortunate that the
authors chose to write in a rather discursive
style, for this tends to obscure somewhat both this
form and the artful manner in which they move
19611
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between empirical data of two kinds. The first
consists of studies supportive of the general prop-
ositions or assumptions; the second of studies
which relate the character or situation of lower-
class adolescent males in urban areas to these
general assumptions. Their theory of delinquent
gangs thus includes two kinds of propositions,
the first of which postulate a state of fact so that
one or more other propositions, of the second
type, can be derived from the assumptions of the
more general theory.
As one would expect, both the quality and the
quantity of each type of data are uneven, but
usually they have limited themselves conserva-
tively to the presentation of the best evidence.
There are few important omissions. Where little
or no solid documentation is available, they usually
state that the assertion represents their "feeling."
This procedure serves to highlight the gaps which
exist in our verification of even the most simple
conditional propositions.
On the substantive side, their discussion of
legitimacy and alienation is most noteworthy.
Unfortunately, Weber's concept of the validity
of norms, which is not their "moral validity"
but refers to an anticipated reaction by public
officials to violations, is not integrated into their
discussion, although the idea is employed several
times. Weber's validity seems to be quite relevant
to "fear," and it raises questions as to whether
or how alienation solves all the actor's problems
of "guilt, anxiety, or fear." (p. 130) What about
the place of the "certainty of sanction," and does
it relate to "unjust social arrangements" in other
ways? What about the "relativity of formal and
informal sanctions"? Certainly much research is
needed on the behavioral relevance of and the
relationships between legitimacy-alienation, valid-
ity, and moral validity.
I would nominate as the most unsatisfying of
their general assumptions the idea that the origin
of a collective adaptation to problems of adjust-
ment requires a shared problem. It is not incon-
ceivable that persons can develop collective adap-
tations to diverse problems upon some basis of
mutual but diverse interests or needs, as is done in
Reaching the Fighting Gang (1960), by the New
York City Youth Board, pp. 15-21. Certainly
most sociologists will want to accept these authors'
idea, which is so central here, but it is still lacking
in documentation. The quotation of A. K. Cohen's
similarly unsubstantiated assertion (p. 139), while
persuasive, is hardly evidence. The idea has been
around a long time. Is there no evidence in the
studies of "small groups" or of radical religious
movements?
One is also prone to question their account of
why those lower-class adolescents who become
delinquents aspire only to improved economic
position within their social milieu and do not
aspire to membership in the middle-class. They
state it is because "expectations are scaled down
to accord with the realistic limitations on access
to educational opportunities." (p. 103) But, on
the other hand, they also assert that these adoles-
cents have ability and have been led to expect
opportunities, and then state further that they are
alienated from the schools because of the goals
they have selected (and not vice versa). Where
did they get these expectations, as distinguished
from aspirations? Here we seem to go round and
round. Similarly, why do some double failures
select the retreatist subculture while others lower
their aspirations "realistically" and become
"corner boys"? (p. 184) On most matters, the
authors argue consistently that these delinquents
are realists. Why not here? Or if both these choices
represent "reality," what determines their choices
between them? Still, it is precisely the importance
of these questions and others which this book




GROWING Up ABsuRD. By Paul Goodman. New
York: Random House, 1960. Pp. 296. $4.50.
Growing Up Absurd is about what it means to
grow up in what Mr. Goodman calls the "or-
ganized" society. The argument of the book is
ambitious, dealing both with such specific problems
as juvenile delinquency and larger questions of the
organization of society. Indeed, it is precisely
Goodman's contention that you cannot deal with
the specific problems sensibly without under-
standing the larger question.
Let me summarize the main themes briefly.
According to Goodman, our society has failed to
complete a number of revolutions for which it was
historically ripe. These revolutions have to do
with the physical environment (technology,
urbanism), economic and social changes (the
dignity of labor, production for use), political and
constitutional reforms (democracy, freedom, race,
[Vol. 52
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pacifism), moral prenlises (science, religion, popular
culture), arid problems of childhood and adoles-
cence (sex, education, vocation). Having started
these revolutions and thereby undermined older
social forms, we failed to complete them and thus
develop newer and more adequate forms. Conse-
quently, adults have difficulty finding meaning in
their lives, finding values to give their activity
direction. In this moral vacuum, society becomes
more and more tightly organized around a set of
values and procedures in whose rightness no one
really believes, although (because of this tight
organization) no one can conceive or comprehend
of any alternative ideas or ways of doing things.
What, Goodman asks, is it like to grow up in
this society? There are few jobs worthy of a man,
jobs that have any visible use, for a boy to aspire
to. No one listens to what youngsters have to
say, no one takes them seriously. The class struc-
ture is rigidifying, so that those who are born
poor find it impossible to be respectably poor in a
society with a rising standard of living; they
become instead outcasts. Children no longer
learn how to do anything, as opportunities to
observe grown-ups at work or to explore the
environment disappear with the growing com-
plexity of cities. Patriotism is discouraged by the
failure of our politics and politicians to do anything
about pressing problems or, even, to at least be
honest. Our sexual mores are confused or, where
they are not confused, restrictive. There are no
high ideals to inspire faith.
All there is is a cynical, pointless system, a
rat race. Some of our youth, with the proper ad-
vantages, get into the rat race and become cynical
and disillusioned organization men. Some with
advantages don't like the race and refuse to get
into it; they become "Angry" critics or Beat
refugees, neither able to develop a yiable culture
of his own. Those who are disadvantaged give
up and build, in a kind of reaction formation, a
pointless and malicious society of their own-the
gang.
Juvenile delinquency, in short, is seen as one
of the inevitable consequences of a society which
cannot provide any decent models or opportunities
for its children. It is one of the possible conse-
quences of such a society, and its roots are the
same ones which produce the organization man,
the beatnik, and the hipster.
Goodman's argument covers a lot of territory
and those who expect every argument to be ac-
companied with certified scientific evidence will
dismiss it as mere speculation. This would be a
great mistake. Goodman may be wrong about
many things-and we will not know for sure until
scientific evidence has been gathered-but certain
characteristics of his argument seem to me in-
controvertibly sound and a necessary corrective
for current theories of delinquency. Let me point
these out.
1) We cannot discover the causes and genesis of
delinquency solely by looking at and into de-
linquents. Instead, we must examine the whole
process of growing up in our present society.
We must see what problems youngsters have to
face and what the possibilities of dealing with
those problems are for youngsters of different
kinds. Delinquency, in short, needs to be put into
comparative perspective.
2) Programs designed to do away with or con-
trol delinquency will probably fail if they are
simply aimed at changing the delinquent in some
way so that he will not misbehave any more. If
the sources of delinquency, for example, are broken
homes or poverty we can prevent delinquency only
by doing something about present-day family
life and the economic system which produces
people who cannot even be respectably poor, not
by giving psychotherapy to "pre-delinquents."
This, of course, is "impractical." But Goodman's
point is precisely that only large changes, by their
nature "impractical" because they would meet
with much resistance, are likely to have any
chance of success.
Much of Goodman's book is devoted to re-
minding us of things everyone knows. It has the
virtue of insisting that we take these things
seriously instead of piously saying "Yes, of course,"





LITTLE ROcK, U.S.A.: MATERIALS FOR ANALYSIS.
Selected and Edited by Wilson Record and
Jane Cassels Record. San Francisco: Chandler
Pub. Co. Pp. viii, 338. $2.25.
In producing their compendium of court records,
newspaper accounts, official documents and diverse
interpretive materials dealing with the events and
opinions leading up to and surrounding the opening
of Little Rock's Central High School in August,
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1959, the Records have made a unique contribu-
tion to the study of race and ethnic relations.
Little Rock, U.S.A. is ". . . compiled for the con-
venience of students writing research papers."
In addition to the materials themselves there
is included an. extensive, well annotated, bibli-
ography; fifteen suggested topics for "essays or
term papers"; and an eighteen page chapter
(prepared by the publisher) on "Documenting
your Research Paper." A considerable amount of
space throughout the book is also devoted to
demonstrating (repeatedly) the proper form for
citing the collection itself as a source. Unfortu-
nately, the last sentence of the book should have
received more emphasis. Only at this point is the
student cautioned that ". . . edited versions, even
carefully and scrupulously edited versions, may
depart from originals."
Persons other than "writers of term papers"
(and their teachers), however, will also find the
work useful. For in the wealth of material pre-
sented, there is much to enlighten the individual
who is in daily contact with the problems of a
changing America. From the school board member
to the police administrator, there are aspects of
the events which took place in Little Rock which
will have a familiar ring. Here is the rare op-
portunity to see the consequences-and often the
rationale-of the various actions taken by such
men in their attempts to solve these problems.
It is unfortunate that collections of materials
for analysis of this kind are so rare; for the diffi-
culty of persuing primary source material is often
great enough to prevent students from under-
taking their own interpretation and analysis of
events. There is a great need for more such col-
lections focussing upon events of significance
so that students, within the setting of coursework,
can carry out the analytical aspect of research





PUBLIC EXECUTIONS IN PENNSYLVANIA, 1682 to
1834. By Negley K. Teeters. JOURNAL OF THE
LANCASTER COUNTY HISTORICAL SOCIETY, Vol.
64, No. 2, pp. 85-164 (1960).
In this 80 page monograph, Dr. Teeters has
recounted in careful detail the public executions
in Pennsylvania for a period of a century and a
half. Dr. Teeters gives "photographic" details of
"techniques and places" of executions with case
histories and reports from original public docu-
ments together with early drawings and sketches.
A major part of the work covers detailed facts on
108 persons executed in the state. The study is a
"grim and gray" review of the tragic and violent
methods used in capital punishment in early
Pennsylvania.
WALTER A. LUNDEN
Iowa State University
[Vol. 52
